William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Popular Media

Faculty and Deans

7-26-2022

The Supreme Court Decisions on Guns and Abortion Relied
Heavily on History. But Whose History?
Allison Orr Larsen

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Legal History
Commons
Copyright c 2022 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media

SKIP

TO

MAIN

CONTENT



ON

THE

BENCH

Opinion | The Supreme Court Decisions on Guns and Abortion
Relied Heavily on History. But Whose History?
Justices say that history is a more legitimate way to interpret the Constitution, but they are taking that history from motivated
advocacy groups, not professional historians.

Professional historians are already complaining that the court got the history wrong in its recent cases,
either by cherry-picking authorities or leaving out important nuance or both. | AP Photo
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T

he Supreme Court’s recent decisions on guns, abortion and religion
that sent quakes through the U.S. legal system have a common
thread: the use of history to answer constitutional questions. Many of

the court’s current justices — particularly justices on the court’s right wing —
tend to turn to history because they believe doing so is a more objective, less
discretion-laden form of judicial decision-making. Justice Clarence Thomas,
writing for the court in the guns case, put it this way: “Reliance on history to
inform the meaning of constitutional text is more legitimate, and more
administrable, than asking judges to make difficult empirical judgments.”
This is a significant move. History has always played a role in constitutional
interpretation, for some jurists more than others. But if history is going to be a
key driver for the Supreme Court’s decisions — on the assumption that it is
more legitimate than other forms of judicial discretion — then it is imperative
to ask where the justices are getting their historical sources, whether those
sources are fact-checked, and (most importantly) who is narrating the history.
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Increasingly, the justices are relying on amicus briefs for historical
information. Amicus briefs — also called “friend of the court” briefs — are
submitted by third parties and have gone through a tremendous growth spurt
at the Supreme Court in recent years. By way of comparison, there were 23
amicus briefs filed in Roe v. Wade and over 140 filed in Dobbs v. Jackson

Women’s Health, the decision that overturned it. That is a new trend.
Hundreds of amicus briefs are now filed in big cases; the justices particularly
value (and love to cite) the briefs that provide new factual information,
including historical accounts.

These amicus briefs — sometimes signed by historians, sometimes not — are
virtually all written by lawyers and often filed by motivated groups that are
pressing for a particular outcome. The history they present, in other words, is
mounted to make a point and served through an advocacy sieve. That
distinguishes this type of history from the work product of professional
historians who (even when they have a point of view) are trained to gather
evidence dispassionately. As historian Alfred H. Kelly once put it, “The truth of
history does not flow from its usefulness.” But usefulness is exactly the point
when litigating a case at the Supreme Court — and historical sources are being
used by the advocates to win.

The modern reality is the justices look to their
friends and allies for historical sources, and
rather than fact-check them — which they
don’t have the time, resources, or expertise to
do — they accept these historical narratives at
face value.
—

In a recent dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer acknowledged this problem, using
the less-than-flattering label of “law office history.” “Although I agree that
history can often be a useful tool in determining the meaning and scope of
constitutional provisions,” Breyer wrote, “I believe the court’s near-exclusive
reliance on that single tool today goes much too far.” Part of Breyer’s concern is
about the combination of history and advocacy. “Law office history” eliminates

nuance, can be cherry-picked, and purports to provide clearer answers than
history could possibly provide.
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The modern reality is the justices look to their friends and allies for historical
sources, and rather than fact-check them — which they don’t have the time,
resources, or expertise to do — they accept these historical narratives at face
value. In the end, this creates an echo chamber where the history the justices
cite is the history pressed to them by the groups and lawyers they trust, which
conveniently comports with their preexisting worldviews and normative priors.
From a distance, this process may look vaguely familiar; it resembles the oftenmaligned fact-finding process in a congressional hearing in which each side
calls witnesses to say what they want to hear in order to create a record without
really attempting to learn anything new. That may be a defensible process for a
democratically accountable body like Congress that can be ousted in the next
election, but it is a far cry from the neutral information-gathering process most
of us expect from judges with lifetime tenure.
Professional historians are already complaining that the court got the history
wrong in its recent cases, either by cherry-picking authorities or leaving out
important nuance or both. When it came to the history of gun regulation, the
court was awash in competing historical amicus briefs. The court chose one
side, and in so doing caused historians to cry foul that the other history was
ignored or distorted. In the abortion case, historians of the Middle Ages say
some of the texts the court cites as proof that abortion was a crime in the 13th

century are not about what we would think of as crime at all, but instead about
“penance” imposed by the Church — an ambiguity easily lost on people who are
unfamiliar with medieval Latin. Indeed, it is worth noting that much of the
13th-century history the court recounts seems to have come from a brief filed
not by historians, but by professors of jurisprudence who publish on the moral
implications of abortion — well-respected professors in their fields, perhaps,
but certainly not medievalists.
This reveals a systemic problem about relying on amicus briefs for historical
narratives: The amicus market is dominated by motivated scholars. Because
many neutral experts do not pay attention to the courts or participate in
advocacy, the historical accounts presented to the justices are necessarily
incomplete and motivated to build a particular argument.
The amicus brief is an old tool being put to a new purpose, and it is time for an
update. The good news is that a few common-sense reforms would improve the
situation.
First, the Supreme Court should require anyone who files an amicus brief to
disclose who paid for it. Current rules require disclosure only of whether the
party contributed financially or otherwise to the brief, but they do little to shed
light on briefs filed by neutral-sounding organizations that are in reality funded
by those with an interest in the case (even if not the party). As any new
researcher is taught and any cross-examiner knows well, a source’s motivation
is intrinsically tied to its credibility. (Are you being paid for your testimony? Is
this product review being compensated by the seller?). If the justices are blind
to the actual funders of the amici, then they have no way to evaluate critically
the submissions coming from them, or at the very least could be too
embarrassed to cite them.
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Second, the justices should borrow a practice from the laws of evidence and
forbid any amicus brief presenting historical or other factual claims from
adding accompanying legal argument. At trial in lower courts, there are strict
limits on expert witnesses offering opinions on the law or generally opining on
the case’s outcome. The idea is that this legal commentary detracts from the
status of the expert as a neutral adviser, and that it oversteps the value and
point of an expert witness in the first place.
Third, justices should build in a process to request the specific history they are
interested in earlier in the case’s timeline — in an attempt to recruit historians
who may not be following the court’s every move but who are actual experts in
the matter. If historians of medieval law knew their knowledge on abortion in
the 13th century was so valuable when the court took the case (as opposed to
after the leak in Dobbs) there might be incentive for more of them to
participate in the briefing process.
History is contestable and the justices are not historians. Choosing among
historical narratives — particularly narratives put together by advocates — will
involve a healthy dose of discretion. Maybe that is unavoidable. But acting like
that process is somehow a cut above other forms of judicial discretion is
dishonest.
If we are going to empower judges to referee history we must start paying more
attention to the process through which they acquire that history. Many
Americans see the court’s recent decisions as a threat to judicial legitimacy;
perhaps one under-recognized threat to that legitimacy lies in the process used
to make them.
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